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DIFFERENTIATING GATEKEEPERS
Arthur B. Laby*
INTRODUCTION
Collective blame for recent business failures has fallen on gatekeepers.
The conventional view is that auditors, lawyers, underwriters, analysts, and
others have shirked their responsibilities and permitted illegal conduct. If
we clarify and enhance the responsibilities of gatekeepers, some say, we
will avoid such debacles in the future.1 This claim traditionally depended on
a rational actor model under which a gatekeeper would prevent misconduct
by a primary violator because the gatekeeper’s expected liability or
reputational harm from failing to prevent misconduct exceeded the benefits
gained in fees.2 Because investors understand a gatekeeper would not act
irrationally, his statements are to be believed.3 While this model has merits,
it fails to distinguish among gatekeepers, who are likely to respond
differently to incentives. It also fails to appreciate differences in the

* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law–Camden. I gratefully acknowledge
comments and suggestions from Sharon Byrd, James Fanto, Jay Feinman, Jill Fisch, Edward
Janger, Sung Hui Kim, Richard Lai, Dennis Patterson, George Siedel, Allan Stein, and
participants at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on New Models for Securities Law
Enforcement: Outsourcing, Compelled Cooperation and Gatekeepers. Special thanks to Roberta
Karmel and Edward Janger for organizing the Symposium. Sue Carpenter, Michelle Ferrigno, and
Michael Suleta provided valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 55 (2003) (noting
consensus that insufficient deterrence is to blame for corporate scandals); Hillary A. Sale,
Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 407 (2003) (stating that
gatekeepers did not do their jobs in companies such as Enron). Compare John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV.
301, 345–63 (2004) (proposing modified form of strict liability for auditors and proposing
gatekeeper responsibilities on attorneys), with Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A
Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 368–74 (2004) (proposing modified strict
liability limited by contract).
2. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud,
Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 317 (2004) (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley accepts a
deterrence model that “hypothesizes that target decision-making is conducted by comparing the
cost of compliance with the product of enforcement threats and penalty levels”); Jill E. Fisch &
Carolina M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct
Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 524 (2003) (“[T]he reforms of
Sarbanes-Oxley are principally directed toward improving the incentives and responsibilities of
gate-keepers—especially accountants.”); Sean Griffith, Afterword and Comment: Towards an
Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2003) (stating that investors can
take comfort in gatekeepers’ opinions because firms risk both legal liability and discredit to
reputation if false); Reinier Kraakman, Third Party Liability, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 583, 585–86 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (stating that
accountants, underwriters, and lawyers often prevent misconduct, regardless of its returns).
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and Third Party
Opinions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 59, 60 (2005).
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character of a gatekeeper’s relationship with a primary violator and to
consider whether such differences bear upon gatekeeper behavior.4
This paper examines gatekeepers by focusing not on their similarities,
but on their differences. All gatekeepers are not alike. They vary widely in
the functions they serve, skills necessary for the job, relationships with their
principals, and duties they owe. There are differences in their approaches as
well. Accounting determinations, for example, are often formalistic and
unambiguous, while legal advice is said to be more nuanced, requiring an
attorney to explore a range of options with a client, who evaluates the
lawyer’s advice and then makes up her own mind.5 The securities analyst,
unlike the accountant or lawyer, makes predictions, which are frequently
wrong.6 Distinguishing among the character of gatekeepers’ evaluations is
helpful, but it masks deeper differences in the structure of gatekeepers’
relationships with their clients.
This article focuses on one difference in particular that bears closely on
whether the gatekeeper can be effective: whether, as a normative matter, the
gatekeeper is meant to be independent of the client, acting as a neutral
umpire,7 or whether the gatekeeper is meant to be dependent on the client,
charged with promoting the client’s ends in a fiduciary or similar capacity.
The label dependent is used because certain gatekeepers depend on the
client to determine the nature, purpose, and scope of their agency.
Distinguishing between independent and dependent gatekeepers,
however, is only a starting point. One also must ask why gatekeepers have
not been more robust monitors. At least part of the answer is that the
conventional view of the gatekeeper’s role is inadequate, focusing on the
actions of a single individual, rather than the dynamics of the group.
Similarly, until recently Congress, regulators, and courts have relied largely
on a command and control philosophy of governance, rather than
addressing biases that can cause one small misstep but lead incrementally to
large scale disasters. Thus, rather than looking at the gatekeeper problem
from the perspective of a rational actor, this paper explores it from a
behavioral viewpoint.
4. Kraakman, supra note 2, at 586 (discussing accountants, underwriters, and lawyers);
Coffee, supra note 1, at 309 (discussing auditors, rating agencies, analysts, investment bankers,
and attorneys).
5. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure: Redrawing the Boundary Between
Lawyer and Accountant Responsibility 13–16 (Duke Law Sch., Working Paper No. 28, 2005);
Coffee, supra note 1, at 353 (describing the auditor’s world as “relatively precise and rule
bound”). Much of accounting is of course nuanced as well. Accounting literature, for example,
requires the auditor to conclude that the financial statements, apart from technical reporting rules,
“fairly present” an issuer’s financial position and operations. See, e.g., United States v. Simon,
425 F.2d 796, 805–06 (2d Cir. 1969).
6. Coffee, supra note 1, at 353 (“[T]he securities analyst is essentially a prognosticator whose
predictions about the future are frequently wrong.”).
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1293, 1300 (2003).
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Advances in behavioral and social psychology demonstrate that
individual behavior is strongly influenced by others.8 Commenters in this
area have begun to pay attention to the institutional and interpersonal
context in which gatekeepers formulate judgments about whether the
conduct of others is appropriate.9 Joining this chorus, this article maintains
that dependent gatekeepers, far more than independent ones, perform their
responsibilities under the yoke of unconscious bias that affects the rigor
they bring to the gatekeeping task and the accuracy of their judgments.
Thus, the thesis advanced is that independent agents are better gatekeepers
than dependent ones.
Drawing on this literature, however, does not suggest that people who
make poor decisions or fail to guard against wrongdoing are not
responsible. It is easier, however, to investigate harm after it occurs and
assign blame than to conduct a searching inquiry into one’s underlying
decision process with the aim of improving it.10 Furthermore, this paper
does not attempt to provide a complete behavioral explanation of
gatekeeper conduct, but rather raises, for future consideration, whether
insights from behavioral psychology can be married with the understanding
of the structure of gatekeeper relationships.
Part I of the paper distinguishes independent from dependent
gatekeepers and discusses critical features that differentiate them.
Gatekeepers are categorized as independent or dependent based on which
features should predominate, recognizing that this split is not clear-cut and
some gatekeepers, such as underwriters, share characteristics of both. Part II
draws on research in the fields of behavioral and social psychology to
demonstrate that fiduciaries such as lawyers and other advisors are less
prone to the gatekeeping task than their independent counterparts. Part III
8. See generally S.T. Fiske, Theories of Social Psychology, in 21 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 14413 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B.
Baltes eds., 2001) (recording prominent theories in social psychology).
9. See, e.g., 11th Annual Business Law Forum, Behavioral Analysis of Corporate Law:
Instruction or Distraction?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2006); Symposium, Corporate
Misbehaviors By Elite Decision-Makers: Perspectives from Law and Social Psychology, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1026–34 (2005) (applying self-serving bias
and motivated reasoning to inside counsel role); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The
Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1251 (2002); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the
Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133
(2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 117 (1993); James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of
Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985); see also Revision of the
Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 7919, 65 Fed.
Reg. 76,008, 76,016 (Dec. 5, 2000) (“Two academics presented research tending to show that
subtle but powerful psychological factors skew the perceptions and judgments of persons—
including auditors—who have a stake in the outcome of those judgments.”).
10. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 19 (8th ed. 1999).
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extends the argument by examining indeterminacy in corporate and
securities law, which further complicates the gatekeeping role because it
gives wide latitude to gatekeepers to claim that their principal’s conduct is
appropriate. This “complex nature” of the law provides a “fertile breeding
ground for the kind of motivated and self-serving interpretations that
rationalize unethical actions.”11 Part III then addresses how these
observations help explain recent reforms and discusses several additional
potential reforms.
Understanding recent reforms and suggesting new ones is important
and timely. Efforts are underway to scale back recent changes in the law,12
and the direction of future reforms is uncertain.13 Indeed, many commentators have addressed whether recent changes, including Sarbanes-Oxley,
are worthwhile or have unintended costs exceeding their benefits.14 Over
the past several years, gatekeepers have received careful consideration as
corporate monitors and will likely continue to draw attention.
I. INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT GATEKEEPERS
A. DEFINING GATEKEEPER
Descriptions of gatekeepers typically focus on their ex ante role. One
common definition of gatekeeper is a reputational intermediary who
provides verification or certification services to investors.15 Another is one
11. Kim, supra note 9, at 1030–31.
12. Floyd Norris, Trusting Bosses Not to Cheat, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at C1; Randall
Smith, Aaron Lucchetti & Susanne Craig, Wall Street Pushes for Fewer Market Masters—As
Stocks Revive, Scandals Fade, A Behind-the-Scenes meeting Signals Effort to Reduce Policing,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2006, at C1; Jason McLure, Statistics Show Drop in U.S. Prosecution of
Corporate Fraud, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2006, at 1 (attributing decline to, among other things, shift in
priorities to terrorism prosecutions).
13. See Hedge Funds and Independent Analysts: How Independent are Their Relationships?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Hon. Richard
Blumenthal, Att’y Gen. of Conn.) (urging Congress to expand aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley); id.
(statement of Marc E. Kasowitz, Senior Partner, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP,
Alliance for Investment Transparency) (“[Congress] should consider whether further steps are
necessary” to address hedge funds colluding with analysts.); id. (statement of Dr. Howard M.
Schilit, Founder and Non-Executive Chair, Center for Financial Research and Analysis)
(recommending PCAOB-type body to regulate analysts).
14. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate
Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 745 (2005); Jayne W. Barnard,
Historical Quirks, Political Opportunism, and the Anti-Loan Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 325, 344 (2005); Bernard S. Carrey, Enron—Where Were the Lawyers?, 27
VT. L. REV. 871, 875 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 280 (2004); Roger C. Cramton, George
M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49
VILL. L. REV. 725, 727 (2004); Mae Kuykendall & Elliot A. Spoon, Introduction to Michigan
State University College of Law Sarbanes-Oxley Symposium: Enforcement, Enforcement,
Enforcement . . . , 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 271, 277 (2004); Bernd Schunemann, The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002: A German Perspective, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 35 (2004).
15. Coffee, supra note 1, at 309.
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who is “positioned at a critical point in the flow of events” where approval
is needed before a transaction can close.16 Gatekeepers, however, also
engage in ex post monitoring designed to uncover misconduct after it
occurs, initiate an investigation, and report the misconduct or take
enforcement measures.17 Also, many gatekeepers perform an advisory role
with respect to structural or regulatory issues regarding a transaction
without necessarily providing verification, certification, or approval. Such
advisors are gatekeepers too because we expect them to advise a client to
avoid illegal conduct. Taking these considerations into account, gatekeeper
is defined in this paper as a person or firm that provides verification or
certification services or that engages in monitoring activities to cabin illegal
or inappropriate conduct in the capital markets.
B. DIFFERENTIATING INDEPENDENT FROM DEPENDENT
GATEKEEPERS
The emphasis on gatekeepers in the financial markets is not new. The
early securities laws recognized the difference between independent and
dependent gatekeepers in the context of directors.18 The Securities Act of
1933 placed responsibilities on gatekeepers such as auditors, underwriters,
and company directors, and the legislative history to the Securities Act
highlighted their role.19 In the 1970s, Securities and Exchange Commission
actions against gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants were based on
the so-called access or passkey theory of liability, under which access to the
securities markets was controlled by certain professionals like lawyers and
accountants.20 Today such actions often fall under the rubric of “aiding and
abetting” or “secondary liability,” and the SEC has broad authority to
impose sanctions against those who aid and abet violations of law.21 This

16. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
201 (2004).
17. Kraakman, supra note 2, at 585. While not initiating wrongdoing, a gatekeeper may deter
it or shift its costs away from investors. See id. at 583–84.
18. In the Investment Company Act of 1940, Congress placed responsibility on fund directors
but, in doing so, it required that at least forty percent of a fund’s directors be independent of the
advisory firm that typically establishes the funds it manages. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000)
(prohibiting more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors from being interested persons of the fund).
The statute refers to directors who are not “interested persons,” as opposed to “independent”
directors. Id. Congress entrusted to the independent directors the principal responsibility for
protecting the fund’s shareholders. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979).
19. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29, 35 (1959); see also H.R. REP. NO. 85 (1933).
20. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 174 (1982).
21. 3B HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 14:31 (2d ed. 2006). In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a private plaintiff may not maintain
an aiding and abetting action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As part
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Congress amended the Exchange Act to allow the
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section distinguishes independent from dependent gatekeepers by
examining the roles of four types of gatekeepers: auditors, analysts,
lawyers, and underwriters.
1. Independent Gatekeepers
Gatekeepers are retained as agents to perform a task or a series of tasks
for a principal. In the course of doing so, they receive information, as the
access theory suggests, that puts them in a unique position to evaluate
whether the principal has violated, or is about to violate, the law. But the
tasks they perform and the relationships with their principals vary. Some
gatekeepers are supposed to be independent of their clients in order to
critically evaluate a set of facts and render an unbiased opinion for an
unknown audience. The normative qualities of independent gatekeepers are
illustrated through a closer look at auditors and analysts.
a. Auditors
The auditor of a public company should be the archetypal independent
gatekeeper. Federal law requires that financial information filed by public
companies be audited by an independent public accountant.22 In the world
of auditing, independence has a special meaning beyond exercising
independent judgment required of most professionals. Independence calls
for independence of the audit client. The Supreme Court contrasted the
roles of the auditor and the lawyer with respect to independence. In
deciding whether the work-product privilege applies to auditors, the Court
explained:
The Hickman work-product doctrine was founded upon the private
attorney’s role as the client’s confidential advisor and advocate, a loyal
representative whose duty it is to present the client’s case in the most
favorable possible light. An independent certified public accountant
performs a different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively
depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client.23

An auditor cannot be the client’s advocate. The Court in the Arthur
Young case concluded by saying that the “‘public watchdog’ function
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at
all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.”24 Indeed, the
SEC to bring an action against a person who knowingly aids or abets a primary violation. 15
U.S.C. § 78t(e) (Supp. II 2002). The provision does not address actions by private plaintiffs.
22. Securities Act, Schedule A, Items 25 and 26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25) and (26) (2000) and
Securities Exchange Act § 17(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q(e) (West 2006) require financial statements
to be audited by independent public or certified accountants.
23. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984).
24. Id. at 818.
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courts have stated that accountants have disclosure obligations because of
their “special relationship of trust vis-à-vis the public” and their duty to
“safeguard the public interest.”25 An accountant who knows of, or
recklessly disregards, fraud can be liable for aiding and abetting it.26
The law discourages auditors and clients from developing long-term
relationships. An auditor’s long-term relationship with a client can
jeopardize independence, something accounting literature refers to as a trust
threat.27 Under SEC rules required by Sarbanes-Oxley, audit partners must
“rotate off” an audit engagement after no more than seven years—
presumably to cut short the relationship between auditor and client before it
can blossom into a trust relationship that can impair independence.28
The contrast between auditors and lawyers also is seen by comparing
rules of imputation used by accounting firms, as opposed to law firms.29
Unlike accounting firms, law firms have strict imputation rules that arise as
a result of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.30 If one lawyer in a firm has a
conflict of interest with respect to a client, the conflict is imputed to the
firm.31 With hundreds of clients and lawyers switching firms often, conflicts
easily arise.32 Large law firms manage conflicts on a daily basis by
imposing procedures to ensure that information gained by an attorney
regarding one client does not fall into hands of another attorney at the firm,

25. Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir. 1986).
26. In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1442–43 (D.
Ariz. 1992).
27. AICPA Practice Alert 99-1, Guidance for Independence Discussions with Audit
Committees, May 1999 (Updated through November 1, 2000), available at http://www.aicpa.org/
pubs/cpaltr/may99/supp/public.htm.
28. Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,
Securities Act Release No. 8183, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6038 (Feb. 5, 2003) (“Under the new rules,
no ‘audit partner’ will serve on an audit engagement team for more than seven consecutive years,
and the ‘lead’ and ‘concurring’ partners will be prohibited from serving for more than five
consecutive years.”). Hillary Sale and Jonathan Macey have expressed skepticism that rotation can
eliminate client capture. See Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV.
1167, 1185–86 (2003).
29. See Draft Letter from Richard I. Miller, General Counsel and Secretary, AICPA, Potential
Impact of ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Proposal on Professional Service
Firms: Comparison of ABA and AICPA Rules of Conduct (August 24, 1999) (on file with the
author) (comparing ABA and AICPA rules regarding imputation, conflicts of interest, and
confidentiality).
30. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2003) (“While lawyers are associated in a firm,
none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rules [related to conflicts of interest].”).
31. Id. R.1.10, 1.7(a) (imputing knowledge of one lawyer to every lawyer in the firm).
32. In one recent case, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher was disqualified from representing a limited
partnership in a dispute with a private equity fund because a Gibson, Dunn lawyer, while working
at another firm, had represented the private equity fund. The court noted the “especially heavy”
burden to show the conflict should not be imputed. Casita, LP v. Maplewood Equity Partners
(Offshore) Ltd., No. 603525/2005, 2006 WL 399796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2006).
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who might be under a duty to use the information for the benefit of another
client.
Accounting firms are not so constrained. A conflict by one member of
an accounting firm will only preclude the firm from accepting an
engagement if the conflict could be viewed as impairing another member’s
objectivity.33 Similarly, AICPA rules impose duties of confidentiality, but
they do not impute the knowledge of one member of the firm to everybody
else.34 Accounting firms routinely audit the books of competitors or
companies that have business relationships with one another.35
b. Securities Analysts
A second example of an independent gatekeeper is the securities
analyst. An analyst is supposed to research a company to judge its value as
an investment.36 The analyst’s role should be to review corporate
information and present an unvarnished view of the company to investors or
potential investors. The analyst’s role should not be to advocate on behalf
of the company, but rather, like the auditor, to objectively analyze the facts.
Conflicts of interest must be disclosed.37 The Supreme Court noted that the
analyst’s role in many cases is to expose negative facts the company may
wish to withhold.38 Like with auditors, long-term relationships between
analysts and issuers are discouraged. Evidence indicates that the longer an
analyst follows a company, for example, the more likely he is to evaluate
the company positively.39 Longevity leads to error.
The view of the analyst as independent is under attack.40 Over the past
several years, the principal criticism waged against analysts is that they
have slowly lost their independence and become adjuncts of the investment
banking departments of the firms that employ them.41 These criticisms are
valid and reinforce the view that the norm for the analyst is independence.
33. AICPA CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT ET § 102, interpretation 102-2 (1995) (Conflicts of
Interest).
34. Id. § 301.01.
35. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 193.
36. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003).
37. The Securities Act requires that a research firm paid by a company for issuing research
reports about that company must disclose the nature and amount of the compensation received.
Securities Act § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (Supp. II 2002).
38. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.18 (1983) (noting role analysts play in “revealing
information that corporations may have reason to withhold from the public”).
39. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the Market,
HARV. BUS. REV. 76, 80 (July 2003).
40. See, e.g., Fisch & Sale, supra note 36, at 1043 (“[T]he traditional hands-off approach to
analyst regulation, which was premised on the theory that analysts functioned as independent
gatekeepers, is no longer appropriate.”).
41. Joe Nocera, The Anguish of Being an Analyst, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at C1
(“[A]nalysts were routinely selling investors down the river by promoting stocks purely to land
banking business from companies.”).
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If independence were not expected, analysts would not be denounced for
losing their objectivity.
2. Dependent Gatekeepers
While some gatekeepers like auditors and analysts are supposed to be
independent of their principal, others are not. Dependent gatekeepers
provide advice and recommendations to assist a client in meeting its goals.
They often act in a fiduciary capacity, owing both a duty of loyalty and a
duty of care to the client. As a fiduciary, these agents must act for the
client’s benefit, furthering its ends.42 Courts maintain that the essence of the
fiduciary duty is to act with “utmost good faith for the benefit” of the
principal43 and “single-mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a
duty of loyalty is owed.”44 Regardless of the context, fiduciary cases are
replete with language about how the fiduciary must act to further the
objectives of the principal.45
A fiduciary relationship is characterized by values such as longevity
and mutual trust, and fiduciary cases refer to a close bond that exists
between the fiduciary and the principal.46 Those same bonds, however, are
anathema to relationships held by independent gatekeepers, such as auditors
and analysts. And an auditor is not considered a fiduciary to the client when
performing the audit function.47
The differences in the type of relationships independent and dependent
gatekeepers have with their clients are striking. The characteristics of

42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959) (noting that person in a
fiduciary relationship has a duty to act for the benefit of another as to matters within the scope of
the relationship).
43. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 372 (1983).
44. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 73 N.Y.2d 461 (1989).
45. The “first duty” of a trustee is to act wholly for the benefit of the trust. Willers v.
Wettestad, 510 N.W.2d 676, 680 (S.D. 1994). A company director must act in the “best interest”
of the corporation. Lien v. Lien, 674 N.W.2d 816, 824 (S.D. 2004). A partner must pursue the
interests of his other partners. Ashley MRI Mgt. Corp. v. Perkes, No. 1915/05, 2006 WL 27685, at
***5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2006). A company officer violates the fiduciary duty to her employer
if she fails to act solely for its benefit during the course of her employment. NTSI Corp. v. Nelson,
No. 54229-0-I, 2006 WL 119119, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2006).
46. Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir.
1999) (stating that “close relationship with the Diocese” gave rise to fiduciary duty); Clark v.
Bowler, 623 A.2d 27, 29–30 (R.I. 1993) (stating that close loving relationship gave rise to
fiduciary duties); Broomfield v. Kosow, 212 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Mass. 1965) (finding fiduciary
relationship where “close business relationship and business friendship” existed between two
men); Strode v. Spoden, 284 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955) (stating that family ties
contributed to fiduciary relationship).
47. See, e.g., VTech Holdings, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 348 F. Supp. 2d 255,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In New York, the accountant-client relationship does not generally give
rise to a fiduciary relationship absent special circumstances . . . .”). An accountant, however, can
become a fiduciary by establishing a relationship of trust and confidence, and by providing advice
to a client. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381–82 (7th Cir. 1992).
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dependent gatekeepers are illuminated by examining more closely the role
of attorneys and underwriters.
a. Attorneys
A prime example of a dependent gatekeeper is the lawyer. Lawyers
have a special place in the adversary system, which recognizes that conflict
is inevitable and cannot always be resolved through consensus.48 In the
adversary system, lawyers are not meant to be impartial. An attorney is
required to “advance the client’s lawful objectives and interests.”49 Every
lawyer knows about the duty of zealous advocacy.50 As Geoffrey Hazard
has written, “A lawyer’s service consists of guiding affairs for the client’s
private and often selfish purposes, with an eye to legal requirements that
have been designed for the very purpose of limiting or regulating selfish
purposes.”51
The relationship between client and lawyer is akin to an “informal
partnership.”52 They work together toward a common goal, although the
client, not the lawyer, ultimately calls the shots.53 This is particularly true of
in-house lawyers because of their long-term role as employees or subordinates of the client.54 In describing the lawyer’s role, it is useful to contrast
it with the role of the judge. The traditional figure of justice—blindfolded—
represents the court or the judge, not the lawyer.55 The lawyer, particularly
in litigation, seeks to achieve success for his or her client to the disadvantage of the opposing client; the judge interposes herself between the two
positions, seeking justice.56 The judge’s ethical norm is impartiality; the
lawyer’s is loyalty.57

48. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role
of Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953–1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 367 (2001) (explaining
that democratic adversary theory recognizes individuals are all worthy of dignity and respect,
interests differ, conflict is inevitable, and deliberation will not always yield consensus); see also
HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 9.
49. People v. Reiner, No. B150375, 2004 WL 1171507, at *11 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 26,
2004).
50. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (“[A] lawyer must . . . act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client’s behalf.”).
51. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 172.
52. Id. at 213.
53. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued.”).
54. See Kim, supra note 9, at 1004.
55. Stone v. Williams, 891 F.2d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The figure representing justice is
blindfolded so that the scales are held even, but justice is not blind to reality. Plaintiff therefore
should have her day in court and an opportunity to have a jury determine the merits of her
claim.”).
56. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 64.
57. Id. at 80.
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Notwithstanding the role of zealous advocate, the attorney’s duty of
loyalty is not unlimited. Courts and commentators have recognized the
tension between the lawyer’s fidelity to his client on the one hand, and his
role as gatekeeper on the other—and lawyers are at the center of the
corporate governance debate.58 ABA rules provide that a lawyer cannot
“counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent.”59 ABA rules permit an attorney to withdraw from
representation where the client “insists upon taking action that the lawyer
considers repugnant.”60 Recent changes to the ABA Model Rules, which
expand the circumstances when a lawyer may breach client confidentiality,
illustrate the complexity of the lawyer’s role.61 Certain states, such as New
Jersey, go farther than the Model Rules and require lawyers to disclose
information to prevent a client “from committing a criminal, illegal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death
or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another.”62
Studies suggest that attorneys do not take this language completely
seriously. Particularly with regard to financial injury, only a small

58. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future
Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2003); see HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 65 (noting
that attacks have been mounting against lawyers over the past several years); Dan Ackman,
Enron: Now the Recriminations, FORBES, Nov. 30, 2001, available at www.forbes.com/
2001/11/30/1130 topnews.html; see also Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901,
920 (D.D.C. 1990) (asking why lawyers did not speak up or disassociate themselves from illegal
transactions); Transcript of Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC,
Remarks Before the 2004 Investment Company Institute Securities Law Developments
Conference (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604smc.htm; David J.
Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the
Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 873, 874 (2003);
Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor: Experts Say the Energy Giant’s Collapse Could Trigger
Changes in the Law That Make it Easier to Snare Professionals, 88 A.B.A. J. 40, 44–45 (April
2002); Symposium Panel, The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Panel Three: Ethical Dilemmas Associated with the Corporate
Attorney’s New Role, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 655, 661 (2003).
59. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
60. Id. R. 1.16(b)(4).
61. Before 2003, the Model Rules provided that client information could not be revealed,
without the client’s consent, unless necessary “to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily
harm” or “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (amended 2003). In 2003, the ABA amended its rules in accordance with
changes recommended by the Ethics 2000 Commission. Revised Rule 1.6 differs from the old rule
in two ways. A lawyer now can reveal confidential information if necessary “to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm” or “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial
injury to the financial interests . . . of another.” Id. R. 1.6(b)(1) (2003). After some debate, the
ABA determined that the rule would be permissive; disclosure is not required. See Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the 2003 Changes to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 35, 38–39 (2003).
62. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006).
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percentage of lawyers make the required disclosure.63 This is not surprising
as the overall role of the lawyer is to promote the aims and objectives of his
client. The unwillingness to make such disclosures is consistent with the
insights from behavioral psychology, explored below. As one writer noted,
“In the law, bias is a professional obligation.”64 While lawyers are
occasionally found liable for wrongdoing, the facts of those cases are
generally egregious.65
While this paper places lawyers in the dependent gatekeeper class,
occasionally one hears that lawyers must be independent. What does
independence mean in this context? Geoffrey Hazard has distilled a
lawyer’s independence to four principles: independence from the state,
independence from improper relationships (including other clients and
colleagues), independence from personal views regarding politics or
morality, and independence from the client.66 This last principle warrants a
closer look because if lawyers are supposed to be independent of their
clients, then they would fall into the category of other independent
gatekeepers, like auditors.
A lawyer’s independence from the client, however, is different from the
auditor’s or analyst’s independence. Hazard explains that a lawyer’s
independence from the client means forbearing from assisting a client in
violating the law or from rendering advice that encourages a violation.67
Such conduct ultimately would harm the client and be tantamount to a
violation of the duty of loyalty. Independence in this special sense,
therefore, is better described as a corollary of the duty of loyalty, not
opposed to it.68 A lawyer also is said to be morally independent from his
client in the sense that while the lawyer acts on behalf of the client, the
actions and responsibilities of the two are distinct.69 Moral independence in
that regard does not detract from the thesis of this paper; it supports it
because it demonstrates that lawyers, as zealous advocates, make arguments
that they may feel uncomfortable making on their own behalf.
The lawyer’s role as gatekeeper is clearest when giving legal opinions;
it is there one should look to determine whether a lawyer is independent of
his client. A legal opinion is an informed judgment, usually reduced to

63. Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients
Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 129–30 (1994).
64. PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 55 (1998).
65. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424,
1450–52 (D. Ariz. 1992) (explaining that Jones Day provided opinion letter despite evidence it
knew Lincoln backdated files, destroyed documents, and violated regulations).
66. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 147.
67. Id. at 159.
68. Id. at 116 (“A corollary of the principle of independence is the virtue of loyalty to client.”).
69. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 508–09 (1994).
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writing, on discrete legal issues.70 An opinion generally provides the
recipient with the lawyer’s judgment on how a particular court would
resolve a discrete issue.71 Lawyers provide opinions to clients and nonclients on a number of matters that allow a transaction to go forward.72 In
giving an opinion, the lawyer does not function as a conventional advocate.
Rather, the goal of the opinion giver should be to fairly and accurately
provide a legal conclusion based on the relevant facts.73 When a lawyer
gives an opinion and he knows or has reason to know that a third person is
likely to rely on it, the lawyer owes the third person a duty of reasonable
care.74
The lawyer’s responsibility to a third person when preparing an opinion
is in tension with his responsibility to his client.75 The lawyer as opiniongiver is not completely objective for several reasons. First, a lawyer
rendering an opinion often serves a dual role as opinion-giver and engineer
of the transaction about which he is opining.76 In that sense, the lawyer is
passing on his own work, which, as discussed, is prohibited for the
independent auditor.77 Second, opinions typically are negotiated documents
whose terms are agreed in advance of the consummation of a transaction.78
70. See Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions et al., Legal
Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 BUS. LAW. 1891, 1896 (1979).
71. Third-Party “Closing” Opinions: A Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee, 53 BUS.
LAW. 591, 595–96 (1998).
72. In public offerings, an underwriting agreement often will require outside counsel to give a
negative assurance that nothing has come to counsel’s attention to lead them to believe that the
registration statement or the prospectus is materially misleading. CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. &
JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 102 (3d ed. 2004).
SEC Regulation S-K requires an “opinion of counsel as to the legality of the securities being
registered.” See Item 601(b)(5) to Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2006). In the case of
private transactions, lawyers for broker-dealers often provide an opinion setting forth certain risk
factors and the process the broker used to review the issuer’s offering memorandum, which the
broker-dealer then uses in its sales efforts. JEANNE M. CAMPANELLI & BRADLEY J. GANS,
SECURITIES OFFERINGS; THE MECHANICS OF 144A/REGULATION S UNDERWRITINGS, WHAT
ISSUERS’ & UNDERWRITERS’ COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW NOW (2001) (explaining that opinion
recites investigatory process of issuer and offering memo that counsel undertook and gives
negative assurance that following investigation nothing changed).
73. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 n.63 (2005).
74. See JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 99 (2000).
75. See id. at 100.
76. Griffith, supra note 2, at 1225 (“[L]awyers not only pass judgment, as gatekeepers, on the
validity of transactions, they also exercise a significant degree of authorship over those
transactions.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 152 cmt.
c (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (stating that in opinion-giving role, lawyer must provide a “fair
and objective opinion”).
77. Qualifications of accountants, 17 CFR § 210.2-01(b) (2006) (Preliminary Note) (“[T]he
Commission looks in the first instance to whether a relationship or the provision of a service . . .
places the accountant in the position of auditing his or her own work.”); see also Griffith, supra
note 2, at 1225 (“The conflict between lawyer-as-gatekeeper and lawyer-as-transaction engineer
thus parallels the conflict between accountant-as-auditor and accountant-as-consultant.”).
78. See JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 72, at 103.
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Third, unlike an audit, a legal opinion is considered one aspect of
counseling a client who has requested that the lawyer provide the opinion to
a third party.79 As Steven Schwarcz notes, lawyers should have the right to
issue opinions to facilitate lawful transactions. They should not be expected
to assess the overall legality of the transaction.80 Finally, an opinion does
not give rise to a lawyer-client relationship with the third-party recipient.81
Even those who advocate a more robust gatekeeping role for lawyers
rendering legal opinions concede that opinion givers are not independent in
the same sense as auditors.82
b. Securities Underwriters
An investment bank acting as an underwriter in a public securities
offering plays an important gatekeeping role but, as we shall see, the
underwriter is a dependent gatekeeper in many respects. This may be
surprising because the underwriter is said to play a special role as the only
participant who, as to matters not certified by the auditor, has the
background and knowledge to conduct a sufficient investigation to protect
the investor.83 Section 11 of the Securities Act names the underwriter,
unlike the lawyer, as a potential defendant in a private lawsuit if a
registration statement is misleading.84 Section 11 also provides a due
diligence defense to the underwriter, who must undertake a “reasonable
investigation” to assure itself that statements made in the registration
statement are true.85 The underwriter must perform this responsibility on its
own. It cannot rely on information provided by the issuer.86 “Tacit reliance
on management assertions is unacceptable; the underwriters must play
devil’s advocate.”87 Thus, there is a sense in which the underwriters are
acting independently of the issuer to perform the due diligence required by
the Securities Act. The role of the underwriter, however, is more complex.
Notwithstanding the emphasis on due diligence, the underwriter is not
meant to be wholly independent of the issuer in the same way the auditor is
independent. The issuer engages the underwriter to promote the distribution

79. Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, supra note 71, at 596.
80. See Schwarcz, supra note 73, at 33 (analyzing lawyers’ duties in rendering opinions in
structured finance transactions).
81. Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, supra note 71, at 596.
82. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 59 (“[T]he attorney’s role in this special context of third-party
opinions is fundamentally that of a gatekeeper—a role that is midway between that of the attorney
as advocate and that of the auditor.”).
83. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)).
84. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2000).
85. Id. § 77k(b)(3).
86. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
87. WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (quoting Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 582).
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of its securities.88 In that regard, the underwriter’s role, as an adviser to the
issuer, usually predates the offering itself. In many cases, the managing
underwriter provides advice on a number of issues pertinent to the offering,
such as the type and amount of securities sold, the timing of the offer, and
steps the issuer can take to make itself more attractive.89 As a result of
advice given, some courts have begun to recognize a fiduciary relationship
between an underwriter and an issuer.90
In addition, an underwriter often has a direct or indirect financial
interest in an offering. Some underwriters invest directly in their clients,91
which is prohibited for independent accountants.92 Also, many
underwritings are performed on a so-called best efforts basis where the
underwriter will not receive a fee unless some or all of the securities are
sold.93 In a recent Second Circuit case, the court summarized the
underwriter’s incentives as follows:
Underwriters have strong incentives to manipulate the IPO [initial public
offering] process to facilitate the complete distribution and sale of an
issue. Underwriting is a business; competitive forces dictate that
underwriters associated with successful IPOs will attract future issuers.
Moreover, because underwriters assume a large measure of risk in the
event an IPO fails, they have a direct interest in the IPO’s success.94

Moreover, underwriters perform multiple services for their clients.
Performance of such services, notwithstanding the due diligence respons88. Even where the issuer does not engage an underwriter, but one simply acts for the benefit
of an issuer in furtherance of a distribution, that person is considered an underwriter. In the case of
SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, an association, which helped the Chinese
government during a bond offering in soliciting and receiving funds from Chinese communities in
the United States, was considered an underwriter although it had no contractual relationship with
the issuer. SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1941).
Similarly, promoters, officers, and control persons who promote an offering are generally
considered underwriters as well. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 351–52 (5th ed. 2006).
89. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 120–21.
90. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the underwriting agreement for an IPO
did not itself create a fiduciary duty, the advisory relationship between the underwriter and the
issuer was marked by trust and confidence and gave rise to a fiduciary relationship. EBC I, Inc. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31–33 (N.Y. 2005) (“eToys hired Goldman Sachs to give
it advice for the benefit of the company, and Goldman Sachs thereby had a fiduciary obligation to
disclose any conflict of interest concerning the pricing of the IPO.”); see also Breakaway
Solutions, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. Civ. A. 19522, 2004 WL 1949300, at *13 (Del.
Ch., Aug. 27, 2004) (holding that issuer sufficiently alleged fiduciary relationship with its
description of relationship with defendant underwriters).
91. Royce de Barondes, NASD Regulation of IPO Conflicts of Interest—Does Gatekeeping
Work?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 859, 862 (2005) (“[Investment banks] may, and occasionally do, have
financial interests in an issuer or a securities offering in addition to receipt of underwriting fees.”).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1)(i)(A) (2006) (stating that an accounting firm is not independent
if firm or immediate family member has “any direct investment in an audit client”).
93. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 121–22.
94. Billings v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2005).
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bility under section 11, distinguishes underwriters from auditors and makes
them dependent in a way that auditors now cannot be. Unlike auditors,
which are restricted in the performance of non-audit services, underwriters
continue to have an interest in cultivating the client relationship to obtain
additional consulting and other work.95 The very provision of advice can
turn a non-fiduciary relationship into a fiduciary one by dint of reliance by
the principal on the skills and expertise of the agent and the trust and
confidence reposed in him.96
Application of National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules
demonstrates an underwriter is a dependent gatekeeper. NASD rules require
its members, in some cases, to hire an independent agent (known as a
qualified independent underwriter) to conduct due diligence on a
registration statement and provide an independent pricing opinion.97 If a
conventional underwriter were independent, the NASD rules would be
superfluous.98
This Part demonstrates that all gatekeepers are not alike. Some, like
auditors, are meant to be independent of their clients. Others, like attorneys,
are dependent on the goals and objectives of their clients and often serve in
a fiduciary capacity. Part II explores aspects of social and behavioral
psychology with a view to determining whether these differences bear on
how gatekeepers are likely to behave. Drawing on these insights, Part III
discusses how dependent gatekeepers, charged with furthering the interests
of their clients, are less likely to be effective gatekeepers than independent
ones, and what we should do about it.
II. GATEKEEPER MOTIVATION AND BIAS
Intuition tells us that a dependent gatekeeper will be ineffective. The
dependent gatekeeper faces a dilemma. He can act as a weak monitor,
enhancing his potential liability, but preserving his client relationship and
positioning himself for future business. Alternatively, he can act as a robust
95. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 125.
96. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381–82 (7th Cir. 1992).
97. See NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2710, Corporate Financing Rule—
Underwriting Terms and Agreements (2006); NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2720,
Distribution of Securities of Members & Affiliates—Conflicts of Interest (2006); see also 24
WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES PUB. & PRIV. OFFERINGS § 5:25 (June 2006); 1 HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 19:22 (2006).
98. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Corporate Financing Rule
and Shelf Offerings of Securities, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,731, 70,735 (proposed Feb. 4, 2004) (setting
forth rules governing an underwriter participating in distribution of securities of issuer with which
it has conflict of interest); see also Amendments to the Corporate Financing Rule, NASD NOTICE
TO MEMBERS 04-13, Feb. 2004, at 114, available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/
documents/notice_to_members/nasdw_003258.pdf (noting that NASD member firms have
expanded services provided to corporate financing clients including “venture capital investment,
financial consulting, commercial lending, hedging risk through derivative transactions, and
investment banking”).
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monitor, shielding himself from potential liability, but possibly damaging
his client relationship and acting inconsistently with his fiduciary duty.99
Liability for breach of fiduciary duty could be overcome by fiat.
Congress or regulators could draft laws or rules to trump state common law
and limit liability for certain violations of the duty of loyalty. The same
result might be achieved through contract, although such terms could be
difficult to negotiate and enforce. The SEC’s attorney conduct rules, which
require lawyers to report violations of law “up the ladder” in the business
organization, was a partial measure in this regard. In adopting the rules, the
SEC reaffirmed that they “shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent
laws of a state or other United States jurisdiction in which an attorney is
admitted or practices.”100 While the rules are controversial, the ABA
recognized that federal law may provide a basis for the pre-emption of
attorney-client confidentiality.101
Even if such protections are available, open-ended responsibilities
placed on fiduciaries to act as gatekeepers are unlikely to be effective. One
reason for this, Part I demonstrates, is that a dependent gatekeeper should
be committed to furthering the goals of his principal. This part explores a
related reason, namely whether a gatekeeper’s decision making process in
determining whether to act in a way that could harm his principal is constrained by unconscious bias. This Part begins with a short discussion of
how conventional analysis has failed and why incorporating lessons from
behavioral and social psychology is essential.
A. FAILURES OF CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS
The primary failure of the traditional analysis of gatekeeper liability is
that it did not sufficiently consider the dynamics of the group. People are
motivated to act in the way they do out of biases deeper than an urge to
maximize their wealth, reputation, or another measure of well-being. They
are concerned about many other factors, such as how they are perceived by
peers, and they make decisions in many cases based on what will be acceptable to the group. Moreover, most people stick to their decision, even if the
99. Acting as a robust gatekeeper may be inconsistent with the duty of care, by failing to
further the principal’s objectives, and inconsistent with the duty of loyalty, by acting against the
principal’s interests. Griffith, supra note 2, at 1234 n.43 (stating that vague duties “to ‘the public’
threaten to increase the agency costs of the legal representation as lawyers may seek to pursue
their own ideological goals in favor of client interests”).
100. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 n.7 (Feb. 6, 2003); Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General
Counsel, SEC, to J. Richard Manning, President, and David W. Savage, President-Elect,
Washington State Bar Association (July 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch072303gpp.htm.
101. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Assoc. to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec’y, SEC (December 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/apcarlton1.htm.
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decision turns out to be wrong-headed, long after they figure that out. These
group dynamics, however, are only now getting significant attention in the
literature regarding gatekeeper reform.102
Focus on the individual, as opposed to the group, pervades our system
of justice. Our system determines the guilt of an individual actor.103 This is
consistent with the emphasis in corporate law on discrete rational individuals acting to maximize their own wealth.104 Ignoring group dynamics,
however, is inconsistent with the way individuals operate in a business
environment. This observation is not new. Law and economics scholars,
often criticized by proponents of social psychology, recognized long ago
that the nature of the corporation could be best understood by placing the
individual into the group and recognizing the role of the individual within
it.105 Ignoring group dynamics leads one back to a rational actor model of
individualized action and stresses a “bad apples” approach to understanding
corporate wrongdoing.106 It deemphasizes the influence one person or group
of persons has on another, such as the interaction of a board of directors or
the relationship between and among gatekeepers and their principals. This
de-emphasis elides the complicated causes of misbehavior and may prevent
meaningful reform.
Second, analysts of gatekeeper liability have ignored certain root causes
of corruption. Corruption can begin with certain small steps that “have their
origins in actions that are not themselves corrupt.”107 Small or insignificant
actions can spread within an organization with each subsequent actor
rationalizing that his or her conduct is not much different from conduct that
preceded it. If this is correct, wrongdoing cannot be alleviated in large
organizations by screening out individuals deemed corrupt.108 The problems
are deeper because many or most people are susceptible to the kinds of
actions they ultimately might brand as wrong. And even if one is not
susceptible to committing an action that could be considered corrupt in
hindsight, conventional analysis has not accounted for how loyalty in an
organization can cause some persons to fail to question others.
A related, frequently ignored concern is the haste with which individual
decisions in large organizations are often made. This phenomenon is
masked by the time it takes for tangible results to be achieved, such as the
102. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
103. See James A. Fanto, Perspectives From Law and Social Psychology, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
1165, 1166 (2005).
104. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Discussing Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting Norms of
Market, Agency, Profit and Loyalty, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2005).
105. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 8 (1991).
106. John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2005).
107. Id. at 1180.
108. Id. at 1183.
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introduction of a new product or service. But hundreds or thousands of
smaller decisions are made within an organization for the tangible result to
be achieved, often with little or no reflection. John Darley has explained
that improper decisions “may be overridden by the more deliberate thinking
of the reasoning system, but only if something triggers that system into
action.”109
Third, in addressing gatekeepers’ behavior, ideas of agency cost theory
and the nexus-of-contracts approach are overemphasized. This approach
focuses on purported contractual relationships, such as the relationship
between an individual director and the corporation. It recognizes that a
director’s interests may diverge from the shareholders’ and it considers
ways shareholders can ensure that a director’s interests are aligned with
shareholders’ interests. Under this view, a manager or director’s fiduciary
duty is nothing more than a safeguard to ensure he makes the right
decisions on behalf of investors, as the residual claimants of the firm.110 The
individualism characteristic of the contractualist view, however, is inconsistent with board experience and fails as an explanatory theory of the
recent business failures.111
Finally, conventional analysis remains largely wedded to a “command
and control” (as opposed to a self-regulatory) model of corporate governance. Where a command and control model relies on external sanctions
and rewards, a self-regulatory model relies on shaping employees’ internal
motivations.112 Behavioral and social psychologists have shown that people

109. Id.
110. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
403 (1983).
111. See Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
1259, 1262–64 (2005).
112. Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work
Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1293–98 (2005).

138

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 1

are not profit maximizers.113 As a result, external sanctions and rewards
often are not effective strategies for influencing behavior.114
B. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Lessons from the fields of social and behavioral psychology address
many of these shortcomings. Social psychology bridges the fields of
psychology, which emphasizes the mental processes and behavior of the
individual, and sociology, which emphasizes social structure, social
institutions and processes, and human interaction. In general terms, social
psychology addresses the influences people have on the beliefs and
behavior of others.115 Much of the work in this area focuses on an
individual’s behavior in a social environment and motivations that affect
the individual’s decision making.116 It is a broad field with, by one count,
some 600 theories to explain human behavior.117
The research suggests that unconscious bias can affect gatekeeper
decisions. Social psychology teaches that goals and motives influence
reasoning—the way people process information—and the judgments they
make.118 Motives affect reasoning by inducing people to rely on a biased set
of cognitive processes that reflect the goals we seek to achieve. Cognitive
processes that can become corrupted include the way one accesses information and the way one constructs and evaluates beliefs.119

113. Id. at 1297–98 (citing Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command and
Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment, 19
L & POL’Y 415, 415–43 (1997)); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An
Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 363 (1997); Andrew A. King & Michael Lenox,
Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 698–716 (2000); Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1181–1272 (1998); Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation
Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 529–59 (1997));
see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 218 (1995) (“[C]ognitive psychology has established that real people use certain
decisionmaking rules (heuristics) that yield systematic errors, and that other aspects of actors’
cognitive capabilities are also systematically defective.”); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behaviorlism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630,
672 (1999) (“[H]uman individuals display a startling ineptitude for comprehending causality and
probability.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1191–95
(1997) (explaining that people do not make decisions based on rational choice).
114. Id. at 1295–96.
115. ARONSON, supra note 10, at 6.
116. E.F. Borgatta, Social Psychology, in 4 THE CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY &
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 1572 (3d ed. 2001); Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity and Misuse of
Power: The Dark Side of Leadership, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2005) (“Most socialpsychological theories subscribe to an interactionist metatheory.”).
117. See Fiske, supra note 8, at 14,420.
118. A motive in this context is any wish, preference, or desire concerning the outcome of a
reasoning task.
119. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480, 480 (1990).
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Gatekeeper decisions also can be biased because of a related reliance on
heuristics, which are shortcuts or rules of thumb we use all the time to aid
decision making. Most work in the area of heuristics and biases concerns
facts. Heuristics, however, also are used in moral and legal decision
making.120 By utilizing heuristics, one can avoid the hard cognitive work of
receiving, understanding, and interpreting complex information and analyzing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.121 Heuristics
work well most of the time, but not always.122 They fail us when a generalization that results from a heuristic is taken out of context and used as a
universal principle where it no longer applies.123
C. REDUCING DISSONANCE
Psychologists explain that goals and motives influence reasoning
because people seek to maintain consonance between relevant cognitions.
The lack of consonance, or dissonance, produces pressure to avoid situations and information that increase the dissonance. One type of dissonance
is post-decisional dissonance, which arises where a person must choose
between two alternatives with positive and negative features.124 Most
people typically choose the alternative that will result in less, not more,
dissonance after the decision is made. In making such decisions, research
demonstrates that reasoning can be driven by accuracy goals on the one
hand or directional goals on the other. When one has accuracy in mind, the
motive is to arrive at an accurate conclusion. When one has a directed goal
in mind, the motive is to arrive at a particular conclusion. Accuracy goals
yield better reasoning; directional goals yield strategies intended to reach
the conclusion desired.125
The distinction between accuracy goals and directional goals goes to
the core of the difference between independent and dependent gatekeepers
120. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1560
(2004).
121. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCH. BULL. 255, 256 (1999); see also Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka & Richard Boettger,
Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping With Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and
Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. 632, 633 (1989).
122. The pioneers in this area of research were Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. They
explained that people rely on a small number of heuristic principles, which reduce the difficult
task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple judgments. See Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124
(1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982); see also Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, supra note 121, at 633 (describing people as
“cognitive misers”).
123. Sunstein, supra note 120, at 1558.
124. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3–5 (Stanford University Press
1962) (1957); see also J.B. Campbell, Cognitive Dissonance, in 1 THE CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 312–13 (3d ed. 2001).
125. Kunda, supra note 119, at 481.
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discussed in Part I. Independent gatekeepers should be concerned with
accuracy. They owe duties of objectivity and accuracy to the public. They
should not be motivated by the clients’ goals and ends in the same way that
dependent gatekeepers are. Dependent gatekeepers, by contrast, are interested in reaching a particular result. A dependent gatekeeper, as discussed
in Part I, must act for the client’s benefit, furthering its ends and presenting
the client in “the most favorable possible light.”126
D. MOTIVATIONAL GOALS
This section discusses mechanisms that result in thought processes to
reduce dissonance that are closely related to accuracy versus directional
goals that arise in the context of group dynamics. The focus is on two
mechanisms—accountability and commitment—that are likely to bear on
gatekeepers’ decisions, and that likely bear differently on dependent and
independent gatekeepers as well as related heuristics that may lead to bias.
1. Accountability
a. The Perils of Accountability in Decision Making
Generally, accountability refers to an expectation to justify one’s
beliefs, feelings, or actions to others.127 Accountability enhances accuracy
because people who are held accountable will avoid making arbitrary or
incorrect decisions. Politicians, teachers, supervisors, and colleagues are
often called upon to be more accountable. Failure to provide sufficient
justification for a decision can result in negative consequences. Providing
compelling justifications results in positive ones.128
But researchers have uncovered a negative side to accountability as
well. Accountability in some cases can negatively affect the formation of
attitudes and the accuracy of judgments.129 One way to understand accountability is that it acts as a constraint on everything we do.130 Constraint
caused by accountability can lead people to censure particular views and to
short-circuit their decision process, omitting important considerations.131
We short-change accuracy goals for the sake of directional goals. Students,
for example, are asked to complete evaluations of faculty anonymously to
ensure that the students will not be held accountable. Imagine how
126. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984).
127. See Karen Siegel-Jacobs & J. Frank Yates, Effects of Procedural and Outcome Authority
on Judgment Quality, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1 n.1 (1996); see Kim,
supra note 9, at 1010–11 (discussing accountability in gatekeeper context).
128. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 255 (reviewing literature).
129. Id. at 270 (summarizing 20 years of research and concluding that accountability is complex
phenomenon that interacts with decision-makers and environment and produces “an array of
effects—only some of which are beneficial”).
130. See Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, supra note 121, at 632.
131. See id.
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inaccurate evaluations would be if we told students they must affix their
signature and justify their beliefs to the faculty they are evaluating.
This example suggests that the effect of accountability on accuracy
differs depending on whether the views of the audience to whom one is
accountable are known or unknown to the decision maker. In the example,
the views of the audience (the faculty) are known to the decision maker (the
student) because the student would be justifying her evaluation to the same
faculty she is rating. People generally are motivated to seek approval from
their audience and are biased in favor of conclusions that conform to the
audience’s views. When the views of the audience are known to the
decision maker before she forms an opinion, she will redirect her opinion to
conform to them. Directional goals take over. People adopt positions that
are likely to be pleasing to those to whom they are accountable.
When the audience’s views are unknown, conformity is not possible
and accuracy goals predominate. In that case, people are more likely to
consider multiple objectives and engage in a more thoughtful, deliberate,
self-critical analysis.132 As Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock explain,
“When participants expect to justify their judgments [to an unknown
audience], they want to avoid appearing foolish in front of the audience.
They prepare themselves by engaging in an effortful and self-critical search
for reasons to justify their actions.”133 Thus, in our example, accountability
could promote accuracy if we held students accountable to an independent
board whose views about the faculty were unknown.
Closely related to the motivation to conform one’s views to those of a
known audience is what psychologists call the acceptability heuristic.
Adopting the position of one’s audience circumvents hard cognitive work.
Studies demonstrate that when participants were unaware of the audience’s
views, they engaged in more complex information processing.134 When one
expects to discuss one’s views with an audience whose views are known,
one will shift attitudes toward those of the audience, even if the results are
inefficient.135 People do this in several ways. One possibility is to rely on
132. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 257; see also Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, supra
note 121, at 633 (explaining that when people do not know audience’s views and are
unconstrained by commitment, people engage in preemptive self-criticism, processing information
from self-critical perspective and anticipating objections of critics); see also id. at 638 (stating that
when audience views are unknown, decision makers think about issues “in more integratively
complex and evaluatively inconsistent ways”).
133. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 263.
134. Serena Chen, David Shechter & Shelly Chaiken, Getting at the Truth or Getting Along:
Accuracy—Versus Impression—Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 71 J. OF PERS. &
SOCIAL PSYCH. 262, 263 n.3 (1996).
135. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 256. In one study, persons making financial aid
determinations, who had to justify their decisions to recipients, allocated funds inefficiently. They
provided some money to all recipients, with the result that many had insufficient funds to cover
costs. Those who were not accountable to recipients, provided enough money to some recipients
to meet their needs rather than trying to please all. Id. In another study, subjects who knew the
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irrelevant information in making a decision. In one study, when asked to
predict grade point averages of a student audience, participants who were
accountable short-circuited their reasoning and relied on irrelevant
information, such as the number of plants a student keeps, as opposed to the
number of hours the student studied.136 This allowed the participants to pursue their directional goals—predicting high GPAs—at accuracy’s expense.
b. Accountability and Gatekeeper Bias
How do accountability and audience views bear on decisions made by
independent and dependent gatekeepers? Independent gatekeepers should
be accountable to an audience whose views are unknown. The audience for
independent gatekeepers, such as auditors and analysts, is a diverse public
with heterogeneous views. Financial statements, for example, are necessary
not only for management to get a complete snapshot of the company’s
affairs, but also for use by creditors, suppliers, analysts, employees, competitors, and, perhaps most importantly, public investors. While some of
these may wish to see a clean opinion from an auditor or a “buy” recommendation from an analyst, others may want the opposite. Empirical studies
of auditors confirm that when audience views were known, auditors were
animated by directional goals and conformed their conclusions to them.
When the views were unknown, auditors were accuracy-oriented and
engaged in a more deliberative process.137
While an auditor may be retained by the issuer, it must conduct itself
independently of the issuer. As Robert Haft has explained, “[T]here is a
greater tendency for courts to decide that a duty to disclose material facts to
nonclient investors exists for accountants than for attorneys . . . .”138
Similarly, analysts should be independent of the companies they research
and should present the company to the public in an objective fashion. These
gatekeepers cannot know the views of their audience as the audience
comprises public investors.
Dependent gatekeepers, by contrast, are accountable to an audience
whose views are known, the clients who hired them. The lawyer’s primary
audience is his client; the same is true for an underwriter. As discussed in
Part I, dependent gatekeepers advocate on their clients’ behalf and, in some
cases, owe them fiduciary duties. The dependent gatekeeper is charged with
furthering the client’s goals, which the gatekeeper appreciates and
understands because the purpose of his engagement is to promote those
views of their audience “expressed more liberal views to the liberal audience and more
conservative views to the conservative audience.” Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, supra note 121,
at 638.
136. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 265.
137. See id. at 257.
138. ROBERT J. HAFT, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES
TRANSACTIONS § 6.01 (1995).
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goals. Sung Hui Kim refers to lawyers’ “ethical ecology,” explaining that
“alignment pressure can distort the lawyer’s judgments.”139
Underwriters, while subject to section 11 liability, assume substantial
risk if an offering fails. Thus, while the underwriter’s dependence may not
be as clear at the lawyer’s, the underwriter faces alignment pressure just
like the lawyer. By contrast, lawyers are exempt from section 11 liability—
Congress simply did not include them in the list of potential defendants.
Moreover, lawyers generally are accountable to their clients, not third
parties, for their legal opinions.140 As one court stated, “[T]he law, as a
general rule, only rarely allows third parties to maintain a cause of action
against lawyers for the insufficiency of their legal opinions.”141 The comment to the relevant section in the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers explains, “Making lawyers liable to nonclients, moreover, could
tend to discourage lawyers from vigorous representation. Hence, a duty of
care to nonclients arises only in . . . limited circumstances.”142 Thus, in the
case of dependent gatekeepers, the views of the audience are known and the
gatekeeper has a strong desire to maintain views consistent with them.
2. Commitment
a. Commitment and Bias
Once people commit to a course of action, they tend to escalate their
enthusiasm. Even after it becomes clear that the disadvantages of pursuing a
course of action outweigh the advantages, people refuse to let go. “Groups
may stick to a consensus view, even in the face of changing information,
because consensus assures them their assessment or decision is correct.”143
Social psychology teaches that when an individual is a group member,
committed to the purposes and tasks of the group, the task of the individual
is to first become a “prototypical member of that group, and then help the
group as best she can in reaching its goals.”144 Moreover, after committing
to a decision, if called upon to justify the choice, people are highly
139. Kim, supra note 9, at 1008.
140. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 601 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(citing Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988)). Lawyers can be liable to
third parties if an opinion was prepared for a third party’s use or the lawyer knew or should have
known a particular person would rely on it. Id. According to the Restatement, a lawyer owes a
duty of care to third parties to the extent the lawyer or client “invites the nonclient to rely” on the
opinion or other services, “the nonclient so relies[,]” and the nonclient is not “too remote from the
lawyer to be entitled to protection.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 51(2)(a), (g) (2000). See generally FEINMAN, supra note 74, at 99 (stating that lawyer owes third
party duty of reasonable care); see also Jay M. Feinman, Attorney Liability to Nonclients, 31 TORT
TRIAL & INS. L.J. 735, 756–60 (1996).
141. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1124.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. b (2000).
143. Khurana & Pick, supra note 111, at 1277.
144. Darley, supra note 106, at 1191.
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motivated to avoid self-criticism and justify their original decision. Studies
show that subjects concern themselves with thinking up as many reasons
they can for why they were right and their critics wrong.145 Psychologists
refer to this as retrospective rationality146 or defensive bolstering.147
The presence of commitment marks an important distinction between
independent and dependent gatekeepers and between accuracy versus
directional goals. Commitment to the interests of the principal is the
cornerstone of the fiduciary relationship which, as discussed, describes the
link between dependent gatekeepers and their principals. Dependent gatekeepers, as fiduciaries, owe a duty of loyalty to their clients to act on their
behalf. They are directed to advance the client’s lawful interests and must
single-mindedly pursue those interests. The traditional model of lawyering
often is referred to as the total commitment model.148
To see how commitment might take hold, consider the role of
gatekeepers in a securities offering. The process begins with the issuer who
will look to an investment bank as a lead underwriter. The lead underwriter
will investigate the issuer and decide whether to underwrite its securities.
After the issuer and underwriter sign a letter of intent, the underwriter’s
experts and its lawyers labor, along with the issuer and its attorneys, to
understand the company from several perspectives and assess its future
prospects. The effort is a joint commitment by the issuer, the underwriter,
and their respective lawyers.149 They have a joint stake in seeing the project
through; they share the same directional goal. This group dynamic is
important to understanding gatekeeper behavior.150 The role of the auditor,
however, is more circumscribed. The auditor, after undertaking its own
investigation, issues a certificate under its name as to the accuracy and
completeness of the financial statements—the goal is accuracy.151
Commitment once established can affect decision making in several
ways. Continuing with the example of an offering, it is likely that the
decision to participate entails some dissonance because not all aspects of an
engagement are likely to be positive and most transactions entail some risk.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, supra note 121, at 638.
Id. at 633.
See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 257.
See Marie A. Failinger, Face-ing the Other: An Ethics of Encounter and Solidarity in
Legal Services Practice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2071, 2103 (1999); see also Roger C. Cramton,
Professionalism, Legal Services, and Lawyer Competency, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUSTICE FOR A GENERATION 144, 149 (1985); Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by
Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1599, 1602 (2002); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 18 (1951)
(referring to the “entire devotion” principle).
149. For a review of the offering process still relevant today, see United States v. Morgan, 118
F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAM WOLFF, GOING
PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION § 2:3 (West 2004).
150. See Fanto, supra note 103, at 1169.
151. See Haft, supra note 138.
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After making decisions, one way people reduce dissonance is to reassure
themselves they made the right choice by focusing on information that will
lead them to that conclusion.152 Once a dependent gatekeeper has agreed to
an engagement, he has committed himself to the client’s ends and is more
likely to focus on positive aspects of the choice and downplay negative
ones.153
This commitment has important consequences. After executing an
underwriting agreement, which generally occurs immediately before the
offering closes, an underwriter must continually assess whether the prospectus should be updated or revised so as to not be materially misleading.
But since directional goals predominate over accuracy goals, an underwriter
committed to the transaction has an incentive to filter information to avoid
amending the registration statement with negative information, which
would impede selling efforts.154 This was the context of the famous case of
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.155 The court held that the appellants,
including the underwriters, were under a duty to amend the prospectus to
reflect developments that occur after the SEC declares the registration
statement effective, and the failure to do so was a violation not only of the
registration provisions, but also the anti-fraud provisions.156
b. Commitment to Outcome Versus Process
Recent research bridging accountability and commitment reinforces the
negative relationship between commitment and accuracy. This line of
research distinguishes outcome accountability from process accountability.
Outcome accountability is accountability for the outcome of a decision; it is
goal directed. Process accountability is accountability for the quality of the
process used to arrive at a decision.157 Outcome accountability increases
commitment to previous decisions about what the outcome should be and
leads to defensive bolstering. Outcome-accountable subjects in decision
making displayed what is known as more scatter (the presence of irrelevant
judgments) than subjects who had to account for procedures, or subjects
who were not accountable at all.158
152. ARONSON, supra note 10, at 194.
153. Id.
154. John J. Jenkins, Recirculation of the Preliminary Prospectus: Statutory Basis and
Analytical Techniques for Resolving Recirculation Issues, 55 BUS. LAW. 135 (1999); see also
COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 211.
155. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
156. Id. at 1100 (holding that by failing to amend, prospectus was no longer Securities Act
section 10(a) prospectus and therefore appellants violated Securities Act section 5(b)(2)); see also
Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 82 F.3d 877, 886 (9th Cir. 1996). The SEC more recently has
addressed a similar problem in new Rule 159 under the Securities Act. See Joseph McLaughlin,
Securities Offerings, Late-Breaking Information and the SEC’s Rule 159, 38 SEC. REG. & LAW
REP. 1077 (2006).
157. Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, supra note 127, at 2.
158. Id. at 14.
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Process accountability by contrast leads to a better decision making
process, such as more consideration of alternatives and less selfjustification.159 If justification focuses on the process used to make
judgments, then accountability can be helpful. Outcome accountability,
however, had no beneficial effects whatsoever, and in fact was harmful
compared to no accountability.160 The distinction between outcome and
process accountability mirrors the distinction between directional goals and
accuracy goals.
The distinction between outcome and process accountability explains
the rules in place with respect to gatekeepers discussed below, and it
demonstrates the difference between them. Independent gatekeepers are not
held accountable for outcomes in the same way dependent gatekeepers are.
Special protections exist for independent gatekeepers—particularly auditors—when the client disagrees with the outcome. It is difficult for a public
company to terminate an auditor when the client disagrees with the outcome. Terminating an auditor is a public event and must be reported on an
SEC form designed to disclose certain material events at the time they
occur.161 No such protections exist for lawyers.
The dependent gatekeeper’s commitment to outcome is closely related
to a heuristic called anchoring and adjustment. Anchoring and adjustment
describes the phenomenon that, in making decisions, we begin with a starting point and adjust our estimates upward or downward insufficiently
relative to where we started. Insufficient adjustments result in bias. If a sale
item costs $1 and the sign says “limit 10 per customer,” you are more likely
to leave with seven or eight, although you need only one.162 Similarly, when
executives forecast a project’s completion, they adjust the estimates based
on new information, but they prepared the original estimates making their
case for success, which skews subsequent forecasts toward optimism.163
Dependent gatekeepers are likely to be more prone to bias through
anchoring and adjustment than independent gatekeepers. Think again about
159. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 258.
160. Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, supra note 127, at 9; see also TOM R. TYLER & STEPHEN L.
BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND
BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 77–89 (2000); Tyler, supra note 112, at 1309.
161. Instructions to Form 8-K clarify that “[t]he resignation or dismissal of an independent
accountant, or its refusal to stand for reappointment, is a reportable event separate from the
engagement of a new independent accountant.” SARBANES-OXLEY SEC RULES & REGULATIONS
§ 490-13, Item 4.01, Instruction (2002).
162. Brian Wansink, Robert J. Kent, & Stephen J. Hoch, An Anchoring and Adjustment Model
of Purchase Quantity Decisions, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 71, 79 (1998) (“A consistent finding in
these studies is that consumers purchase more units when they see high anchors in POP [point of
purchase] promotions.”).
163. Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines
Executives’ Decision, HARV. BUS. REV. 56, 60 (2003) (“Because the initial plan . . . [is] designed
to make the case for the project—it will skew the subsequent analysis toward overoptimism. This
phenomenon is the result of anchoring, one of the strongest and most prevalent of cognitive
biases.”).
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the offering example. The issuer and its lawyers are the ones who generally
draft the initial version of a registration statement.164 In doing so, they are
preparing a document they hope will result in a successful distribution.
With the assistance of the underwriters, they come up with an initial draft
that will then be adjusted based on comments from third parties and the
SEC staff. It is the initial draft of the registration statement, however, that
serves as the anchor, and any amendments must be justified as departures
from the original.
Accountants performing an annual audit or analysts researching a
public company do not have the same anchors to contend with. They are not
wedded to the issuer’s numbers. Under Auditing Standard No. 2, auditors
must obtain independent evidence, employ professional skepticism, and use
the work of others only in limited circumstances.165 The same is true for
analysts. As opposed to using financial data provided by an issuer as an
anchor, an analyst may choose instead to use industry averages against
which to measure an issuer’s performance. In that regard, an underwriter
may seek out analysts’ views, in the context of an offering, to learn of the
strengths and weaknesses of the competition.166
Given that dependent gatekeepers are accountable to their principals
and committed to furthering their ends, careful consideration should be paid
to how directional goals and bias may affect their decisions. One cannot
ignore the powerful draw that motivations have on judgment and the
unconscious bias that can result. Moreover, everyday heuristics like acceptability and anchoring can bias judgments as well. If gatekeepers’ decisions
about whether to stop a transaction from going forward or report wrongdoing to a third person were clear-cut, one would have little cause for concern. Such decisions, however, are highly indeterminate. Part III addresses
the indeterminate nature of such decisions and, drawing on Parts I and II,
what to do about them.

164. See, e.g., BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 149, § 2:3 at 2-16; JOHNSON &
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 72, at 141; see also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643,
689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that issuer’s outside counsel took initial responsibility for preparing
registration statement).
165. See An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction With
an Audit of Financial Statements, PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD,
AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2 ¶¶ 104–12, available at www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_the_
Board/Auditing_Standard_2.pdf; see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN
PERSPECTIVE § 6.26 (2005).
166. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 72, at 343; John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v.
Investor Confidence: Why the New Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1, 49 (2003) (“[A]nalysts gather information (both publicly available and not publicly
available) about the company, its industry, and its competitors. . . .”).
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III. REFORMING GATEKEEPER BIAS
The observations in Parts I and II advance the understanding of gatekeeper behavior. This Part considers recent and potential reforms. The discussion so far suggests two possible paths for reform. One path is to
discount the work of dependent gatekeepers. To the extent they are charged
with promoting their clients’ ends, as discussed in Part I, they are prone to
directional goals as opposed to accuracy goals, as discussed in Part II, and
destined to fail. This appears to be the path suggested by some commenters,
who discuss shrinking the scope of underwriter liability.167 Another path is
to expand the scope of liability of dependent gatekeepers precisely because
of the biases discussed.
The observations in Parts I and II regarding the differences among gatekeepers and the tendency to self-justify are magnified because of indeterminacy in the law. One result of indeterminacy is that when one wants to
reach a particular result, one often can reach it, and then defend the result as
reasonable. This is not true to the same degree for independent gatekeepers.
While auditors face some ambiguity in the course of an audit, as a general
matter, auditors use relatively objective rules that contain few principles
and standards leaving wide latitude for interpretation. If managers sought to
improperly influence financial statements, Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) inhibit such conduct even if the auditors were willing to
oblige.168 This Part, therefore, begins with a discussion of the indeterminacy
inherent in the corporate and securities area.
A. INDETERMINACY IN CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
Securities and corporate law is inherently ambiguous for a number of
reasons. First, notwithstanding many technical provisions, the responsibilities of issuers and market professionals often turn on state common
law fiduciary duties—a notoriously ambiguous area of the law.169 This is
particularly true for the duty of care, which is an open-ended requirement to
exercise the care and skill of an ordinary prudent person.170 Courts,
particularly in the corporate law area, recognize that the duty to pay
attention to corporate matters is inherently ambiguous. In Barnes v.
167. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World? The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern
Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195, 1211 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing
Section 11: Public Offering Liability in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 45, 67 (2000).
168. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 547 (explaining that managers’
temptation to distort financial statements is checked by outside auditor).
169. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998) (stating that fiduciary duties provide only rough guidelines
governing managers’ behavior and rely instead on ad hoc judicial decisions); see also Marcel
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Control, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 1205, 1214, 1237–41 (2001).
170. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
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Andrews, Judge Learned Hand remarked, “The measure of a director’s
duties in this regard is uncertain; the courts contenting themselves with
vague declarations, such as that a director must give reasonable attention to
the corporate business.”171 The latitude inherent in the duty of care is
embodied in the business judgment rule, which provides that, in the absence
of fraud or bad faith, courts will not second guess directors’ decisions if
they turn out badly.172
1. Standard of Care
The ambiguity of the duty of care renders the gatekeeper’s
responsibilities highly indeterminate. Under the Securities Act of 1933, the
underwriter (and others) can defend against a claim of liability if it
conducted a “reasonable investigation” into the facts disclosed in the
registration statement.173 There is little or no guidance, however, on what a
reasonable investigation entails and few litigated cases have been decided
on this point. The leading case, Escott v. BarChris Construction Company,
is nearly 40 years old and, in that case, the court stated, “There is no direct
authority on this question, no judicial decision defining the degree of
diligence which underwriters must exercise to establish their defense under
Section 11.”174 The court could not arrive at a rule: “It is impossible to lay
down a rigid rule suitable for every case defining the extent to which such
verification must go. It is a question of degree, a matter of judgment in each
case.”175 More recent cases addressing whether due diligence should be
decided by a judge or jury make the same point.176 In the end, the standard
required for due diligence under the Securities Act is the vague duty of care.
This standard is now codified in section 11(c) of the Act, which reads, “In
determining . . . what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable
ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a
prudent man in the management of his own property.”177
2. Materiality Requirement
A second reason the law is hard to pin down is that at the heart of every
disclosure requirement, and every claim of fraud under the securities laws,
is a materiality requirement. The materiality standard turns on the
following:
171. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
172. See DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998).
173. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
174. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
175. Id. at 697.
176. In re Software Toolwoks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489, 1496 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(“[W]ith a question like due diligence, the inquiry does not lend itself to any objective
standards.”).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c).
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[Whether] there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote . . . . Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.178

The standard is ambiguous. It depends on what a reasonable investor
would decide, which is often dependent on how a particular judge or
regulator views the facts.179 Attempts to quantify materiality or provide a
bright-line rule have been rejected.180 The Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson rejected a bright-line rule to determine when merger negotiations
would be considered material stating that “ease of application alone is not
an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress’
policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence
as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as
materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.”181
3. Form of Rules
In addition to these substantive points, corporate and securities law is
indeterminate because of the form of the rules themselves. First, securities
regulation is often promulgated through standards as opposed to bright-line
rules. The conventional distinction between rules and standards is that rules
are clear cut and set forth the law ex ante whereas standards provide only
general principles that judges can apply to a particular set of facts. Rules
constrain judicial discretion more than standards.182 Yet standards are
common in the securities area. A frequent criticism of the SEC is that it has
always resisted bright-line rules to preserve flexibility in enforcement
cases.183 The SEC in many cases refuses to adopt bright-line rules and
instead provides factors that apply flexibly depending on the facts. In the
due diligence context, for example, the Commission sought to provide
guidance in Securities Act Rule 176. In doing so, however, the Commission
only set out factors to be considered in a determination of whether due
diligence was met.184 The rule is inconclusive, and the Commission

178. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
179. Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal
Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 664 (2004).
180. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (rejecting rule that five percent is appropriate cut off for
materiality); see also KARMEL, supra note 20, at 236–38 (noting historical forces that have caused
SEC to abandon quantitative materiality in favor of qualitative).
181. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
182. Kamar, supra note 169, at 1914.
183. See KARMEL, supra note 20, at 97 (“[T]he Commission has always resisted requests for
guidelines, expressing the need for flexibility and the belief that guidelines are a roadmap for
fraud.”).
184. 17 C.F.R. §230.176 (2006).

2006]

Differentiating Gatekeepers

151

explicitly left the ultimate conclusion regarding the satisfaction of due
diligence to the courts.185
A second reason why the form of rules in the securities area leads to
ambiguity is that litigation is rare. In many cases, rules are pronounced
through settled enforcement cases, as opposed to through litigated cases or
administrative rulemaking. The vast majority of SEC actions and many
state law corporate cases, particularly in Delaware, are settled. A legal rule
announced through a settlement necessarily lacks the level of specificity
that would attend a decision after a litigated case on the merits with a fully
developed record.186 Moreover, when cases do not settle, many are decided
at a preliminary stage in the proceedings where, again, the record is not
fully developed. Such opinions are likely to be more indeterminate than
cases decided at a later stage in the proceedings when the record is
complete.187 Finally, a settlement sidesteps the need for the government to
articulate the legal theory on which the action is based and leaves potential
questions about its precedential effects.188
Indeterminacy has important implications for gatekeepers. Consider
two examples of the kinds of decisions gatekeepers must make. First, under
new SEC rules governing attorney conduct, the duty to report “up-theladder” is triggered when the attorney “become[s] aware of evidence of a
material violation” by the issuer, and material violation is defined as “a
material breach of fiduciary duty.”189 The attorney, therefore, must interpret
what constitutes “evidence,” what constitutes a “violation” and whether the
violation is “material.” Since the definition of violation includes breach of
fiduciary duty, the attorney is left to determine when a fiduciary breach has
occurred.190 Second, in the context of public offerings, the underwriter must
determine whether the registration statement “contained an untrue statement
185. Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation
and Reasonable Grounds for Belief Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release
No. 6335, 1981 WL 31062, at *13 (Aug. 6, 1981) (“The Commission also believes that only a
court can make the determination of whether a defendant’s conduct was reasonable under the
circumstances of a particular offering.”).
186. See KARMEL, supra note 20, at 220 (“There are fewer clear wins or losses. More cases are
disposed of and less money is spent in the disposition, but the law becomes cheapened in the
process.”).
187. For a discussion, see Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1082−84 (2000); KARMEL, supra
note 20, at 220 (“[T]he adversary system, for all its faults, is a preferred way to ascertain facts and
develop the law.”).
188. Cf. KARMEL, supra note 20, at 166.
189. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 n.7 (Feb. 6, 2003).
190. See Kim, supra note 9, at 1049 (noting that the standard the SEC adopted for “an
attorney’s reporting obligation” is “difficult to understand, interpret and apply”). For a general
discussion of ambiguity in legal analysis, see HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 159–60, 164,
230–31.
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of material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”191 The
underwriter therefore, must determine when a fact is “untrue,” whether it
was “material,” or whether an omitted fact was “required” or necessary to
make other statements “not misleading.” In these cases, the gatekeeper
consciously or unconsciously may arrive at a conclusion acceptable to the
client because of ambiguity in the law.
Finally, it is important to distinguish the ex ante from the ex post
perspectives when assessing gatekeepers’ conduct. One could always argue
that, from an ex post perspective, gatekeepers’ actions or inactions were not
appropriate because they assisted the client with an improper end. From an
ex ante perspective, a dependent gatekeeper has other values to consider.
One such value is client autonomy. The legal system accommodates
individual autonomy by giving significant latitude for individual decision
making above a floor of clear illegality.192 Dependent gatekeepers have
multiple considerations in deciding whether to “report up” in the
organization or force an issuer to make certain disclosures. As mentioned,
federal securities laws do not require disclosure of all material information;
disclosure is only required if an omission renders something that was said
misleading. If the attorney discovers something wrong, it must not
necessarily be disclosed.193 It is precisely in the vagary of trying to
determine whether the omission is necessary to render other information not
misleading that the gatekeeper’s biases are likely to take hold.
B. GATEKEEPER REFORM
1. Focus of Recent Reforms
The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms and their aftermath have accounted for
some of the lessons from behavioral and social psychology. Discussions on
the Senate floor suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Congress sought to go
beyond an approach of punishing individual wrongdoers. Senator Sarbanes
stated:
The bad apples ought to be punished. There is no question about it.
They ought to be punished severely. But it is very clear, as this issue has
unfolded, that we need to make structural changes. We need to change the
system so that the so-called gatekeepers are doing the job they are
supposed to be doing. That has not been happening. That is why we need
to remove these conflicts of interest on the part of auditors who are also
consultants for the same company, collecting huge fees. And they
are supposed to come in as outside auditors and be very tough on
191. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000).
192. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986).
193. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 79 n.14.
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the company, which at the same time is giving them large fees for
consultancy . . . . We have to put in place a framework, a system which
tightens up and begins to screen out these things.194

The new framework departs from the “command and control” model
mentioned above. While one cannot force a change in attitudes, Congress
and regulators attempted to make compliance a priority. Much of the
emphasis in reform over the past five years has been enhancing policies and
procedures to ensure compliance and getting information into the hands of
the persons making decisions. The 2004 changes to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines set forth what organizations must do to have an effective
compliance and ethics program. The changes respond to requirements in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which directed the Sentencing Commission to review
and amend its guidelines to ensure they are sufficient to deter and punish
criminal misconduct.195 Under the revised guidelines, company directors
must be knowledgeable about the ethics program, and they must receive
reports “on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.”196
Similarly, according to the SEC, “Companies also must have internal
communications and other procedures to ensure that important information
flows to the appropriate collection and disclosure points on a timely
basis.”197
In the area of mutual funds and investment advisers, the SEC now
requires codes of ethics198 and compliance programs, including the
appointment of a chief compliance officer.199 In adopting these rules, the
SEC observed that compliance failures have occurred when service
providers to a mutual fund deny information to the board or provide
incomplete information because complete disclosure would harm the
service providers’ own interests. Under the rules, the chief compliance
officer is “responsible for keeping the board apprised of significant
compliance events at the fund or its service providers and for advising the
board of needed changes in the fund’s compliance program.”200 The SEC’s
lawyer rules, also mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, were intended to enhance
the likelihood that companies will act at an early stage to remedy violations
internally. “By mandating up-the-ladder reporting of violations, the rule
helps to ensure that evidence of material violations will be addressed and
194.
195.
196.
197.

148 CONG. REC. S6526 (daily ed. July 10, 2000) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 805(a)(2)(5) (2002).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (2005).
Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange Act
Release No. 46079, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877, 41,878 (June 20, 2002).
198. Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2209, 69 Fed.
Reg. 4040, 4040 (Jan. 27, 2004) (expressing concern that the fiduciary obligations are lost on
growing number of advisers in SEC’s enforcement calendar).
199. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2006).
200. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed Reg. 74,714, 74,722 (Dec. 24, 2003).
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remedied within the corporation, rather than misdirected or ‘swept under
the rug.’”201 The emphasis is less on sanctioning individualized improper
conduct after it occurs and more on promoting structural changes to
strengthen a culture of compliance and address problems at an earlier stage.
2. Independent Gatekeepers
a. Auditors
Congress and federal regulators recognized that, in the case of auditors,
the ties that bound auditors to their clients had to be severed. As Part II
discussed, accountability to the client, whose views are known to the
auditor, can result in an auditor redirecting his opinions to conform to the
client’s views. People adopt positions that are likely to please others. By
performing a significant volume of non-audit services for the audit client,
the auditor had an overwhelming desire to please the client in the course of
the audit itself and continue to generate non-audit business.
The SEC recognized this conflict in its own administrative rules
adopted before Sarbanes-Oxley and sought to insulate the auditor from
improper influence. The SEC prohibited auditors from providing certain
non-audit services, such as consulting services, to audit clients because the
large fees generated by such services could jeopardize the auditor’s
independence.202 The Commission stated that its rules were “designed to
ensure that auditors are qualified and independent of their audit clients both
in fact and in appearance.”203 “If investors do not believe that an auditor is
independent of a company, they will derive little confidence from the
auditor’s opinion and will be far less likely to invest in that public
company’s securities.”204 The auditor, as an independent gatekeeper, must
201. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 n.7 (Feb. 6, 2003).
202. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities Act
Release No. 7919, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,022 (Dec. 5, 2000) (“[I]n recent years there has been a
dramatic growth in the number of non-audit services provided to audit clients and the magnitude
of fees paid for non-audit services.”); see also James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial
Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics of Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301
(2003) (noting reasons accounting firms emphasized growth in non-audit services revenue).
203. Preliminary Note, Qualifications of accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2006). The rules
attempted to ameliorate bias that some argued could never be eliminated completely. Max
Bazerman, for example, argued against the possibility of auditor independence because of selfserving bias. He argued that calls for independence were naïve because auditor misrepresentations
occur not because of any willingness to mislead, but rather because of unconscious and
unintentional bias in decision making. When auditors are called on to make independent
judgments, they will act in a way that is commensurate with self interest. Max H. Bazerman,
Kimberly P. Morgan & George F. Loewenstein, The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 89, 91 (1997).
204. Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at
76,008.

2006]

Differentiating Gatekeepers

155

resist an advocacy role, which characterizes dependent gatekeepers, like
lawyers. In evaluating independence, SEC rules state, “The Commission
looks in the first instance to whether a relationship . . . places the accountant
in a position of being an advocate for the audit client.”205
Sarbanes-Oxley went further than the SEC’s own independence
requirements and prohibited auditors from providing eight categories of
non-audit services, such as bookkeeping, actuarial, investment, and legal
services.206 Sarbanes-Oxley also included a provision placing responsibility
on the audit committee, which must be composed solely of independent
directors, to be “directly responsible” for the appointment, evaluation,
compensation and replacement of the independent auditor for a listed
company.207
Understanding the difference between independent and dependent
gatekeepers illuminates the auditor’s role. The auditor serves to correct the
biases of managers, who are themselves dependent gatekeepers. Managers
are chosen by the board to further the ends of the corporation as a profitable
enterprise to the benefit of the shareholders. Bias on the part of the
managers is appropriate. Unchecked, however, such bias can lead to abuse.
Thus, the bias of the dependent gatekeeper is held in check by the
independent gatekeeper.
Since the audit firm is compensated by the client, some argue it will
always defer to the client to ensure future business.208 While this may be
true to some degree, the requirement to report the termination of the auditor
on Form 8-K reduces this risk. Moreover, this risk was far worse before the
SEC’s auditor independence rules were adopted. The termination of a
consulting agreement, unlike the termination of the auditor relationship, is
not disclosed on Form 8-K. As a result, an issuer could quietly threaten to
terminate a consulting agreement as a club to pressure the auditor to provide
a clean audit.209 If the auditor were not performing non-audit services for
the company, there would be no club.210 While the issuer could threaten to
fire an auditor, that event is publicly disclosed and most companies resist
making such a filing. The SEC’s auditor independence rules began to

205. Preliminary Note, Qualifications of accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (Supp. II 2002).
207. Id. § 78j-1. Under section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, only independent directors may
serve on an audit committee of a listed company. Id. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A).
208. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at
76,015 n.79 (noting that commenters to SEC rule argued there has always been potential for
conflict of interest, since auditor is paid by client).
209. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1411–12 (2002) (explaining that if auditor is consultant, issuer can threaten
auditor in “low visibility” way).
210. Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 63 (2004) (“Managers can thus punish auditors that fail to follow the
managers’ wishes through a reduction in the non-audit related consulting services.”).
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address this concern by limiting the non-audit services that an auditor could
perform for its audit client.
One question in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley is whether auditor
independence requirements have gone too far or not far enough. Above I
discussed the need, with respect to independent gatekeepers, to counter the
bonding that often characterizes a fiduciary relationship. Characteristics like
trust and longevity can threaten independence. The Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), using rulemaking authority in
section 103 of Sarbanes-Oxley, has gone further than Congress or the SEC
in some respects. Under new rules, for example, a public accounting firm is
not independent if it gives tax services to certain persons, such as members
of management who fill a financial reporting oversight role at an audit
client. Performing such services can create the appearance of a “mutual
interest between the auditor and those individuals” and impair
independence.211
Should all non-audit services be banned? Sarbanes-Oxley now requires
all non-audit services the auditor proposes to perform to be pre-approved by
the issuer’s audit committee.212 With respect to certain tax services still
permitted, the PCAOB has made the process more deliberate by requiring
the auditor to play a role in seeking the audit committee’s pre-approval. The
audit firm must describe to the audit committee, in writing, the nature of the
services to be provided, discuss with the audit committee the effects on the
auditor’s independence, and document the firm’s discussion.213
Placing additional limits on non-audit services is consistent with
addressing inappropriate bonding between issuers and auditors. Moreover,
this specified deliberation is consistent with Darley’s discussion of
addressing the small decisions that can grow into large scale corruption. By
slowing the process and requiring the audit firm to describe, in writing, the
services it seeks to perform and the effects on independence, it is unlikely
that a series of quick decisions will be made by either the auditor or the
issuer that will impair independence, at least with respect to tax services.
Requiring the auditor to play a role in the issuer’s deliberation also is
consistent with the overall program of enhancing policies and procedures
that focus less on individualized wrongdoing and more on instituting
compliance norms at both the audit firm and the issuer.
One could consider requiring this sort of deliberative process for all
non-audit services. The suggestion was put forward by certain commenters
on the PCAOB’s rule, but the PCAOB determined to gather experience

211. Ethics and Independence Rules Concerning Independence, Tax Services, and Contingent
Fees, PCAOB Release No. 2005-014, at 34–35 (July 26, 2005), available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/docket_017/2005-07-26_release_2005-014.pdf.
212. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202, codified in Exchange Act § 10A(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h).
213. See Ethics and Independence Rules, supra note 211, at 40–41.
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with respect to tax services first.214 While gathering experience with respect
to tax services is laudable, it may not be necessary if the PCAOB could
obtain the information it needs from a separate request for comment. Indeed
the tax services area is different from other areas of permissible non-audit
services, so the PCAOB would likely have to publish a separate request for
comment before applying the deliberation rule more broadly.215 Since the
deliberation rule does not seem unduly burdensome and would likely have
positive effects, the PCAOB may wish to consider such a request for
comment at this time.
b. Securities Analysts
Securities analysts are subjected to new rules passed not only by
Congress and the SEC, but also by state prosecutors, the self-regulatory
organizations, and others—all with an eye toward ensuring independence.
The concern, like in the case of auditors, was that the analysts were tied too
closely with the issuers they were supposed to be researching.
Congress sought to strengthen analyst objectivity in Sarbanes-Oxley.
The law required new administrative rules restricting when the brokerdealer arm of an underwriter engaging in a public offering can publish
research on the security offered, and it required analysts to disclose certain
conflicts.216 SEC rules now require analysts to include in a research report a
certification stating that the opinions expressed in the report accurately
reflect the analysts’ personal views, and that their compensation was not
related to their recommendations.217 The touchstone for the SEC rule is
independence. While the new rule applies to broker-dealer firms, the
Commission has stated that the rule shall not apply to research performed
by an affiliate of the broker-dealer with a “sufficient level of independence”
from the firm. Those meeting this criteria should have “a sufficient level of
independence so that pressures from the broker-dealer . . . should not
compromise their research.”218
214. See id. at 42.
215. See id. (stating that the PCAOB would seek additional information before expanding the
rule).

216. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 501, adding Exchange Act § 15D, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(b) (Supp. II
2002).
217. If compensation is related to the recommendation, the certification must include the
source, amount and purpose of the compensation, and a disclosure stating that the compensation
may influence the recommendation in the report. Regulation Analyst Certification, 68 Fed. Reg.
9482 (Feb. 27, 2003).
218. Id. at 9484 (defining “covered person”). The technical provisions of the rule make it
applicable to broker-dealers and to associated persons of broker-dealers, which include other firms
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the broker-dealer. The SEC made an
exception, however, for associated persons that do not share officers or employees with the
broker-dealer, and so long as the broker-dealer maintains and enforces policies and procedures to
prevent the broker dealer from influencing the activities of the analysts and the content of the
research. The Commission stated, “Where the broker-dealer has informational and structural
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The securities analyst settlements entered into by ten large investment
banking firms in 2003 contained regulatory requirements to help ensure
“that research provided to investors is objective.”219 Similarly, the New
York Stock Exchange brought actions against analysts for failing to
establish procedures adequate to maintain independence.220 The SelfRegulatory Organizations (SROs), namely the NYSE and NASD also have
adopted rules barring investment banking departments from supervising
analysts.221 An analyst’s compensation may not be tied to investment
banking transactions, and new rules impose a 40-day cooling off period
after an initial public offering before an analyst whose firm managed the
offering can issue a report on the security. To guard against analysts making
an overwhelming number of buy recommendations compared to sell
recommendations, analysts must now disclose the distribution of buy, sell,
and hold recommendations.222 The goal of these reforms has been to
promote independence.223 In approving rules proposed by the SROs, the
SEC made clear that the goal of independence has not been abandoned:
The Commission believes that the SRO proposals are designed to promote
the objectivity and independence of research analysts by explicitly
requiring that all research analyst written and oral communications with
customers, as well as with internal firm personnel, must be fair, balanced
and not misleading, considering the context of the communications. These
requirements build on existing SRO standards for research analyst
communications with the public and provide additional safeguards for
research communications with personnel within the broker-dealer.224

These rules are designed to combat accountability to a known audience
and enhance accuracy-based goals, discussed above. Certifying that an
separations from its associated person, the rule does not apply to that associated person.” Id.
at 9486.
219. Global Research Analyst Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (May 7, 2003) (statement of SEC Chairman William H.
Donaldson).
220. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. Member Organization, New York Stock
Exchange, Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 03-67, 2003 WL 21643131, at *17 (April 22, 2003);
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc. Member Organization, New York
Stock Exchange, Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 03-72, 2003 WL 21643136, at *30
(April 22, 2003).
221. See NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2711 (2006); see also NYSE RULES,
OPERATION OF MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS R. 351 (2006); see also NYSE RULES,
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC R. 472.
222. See generally COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 145.
223. Fisch & Sale, supra note 36, at 1038 (“The goal of these various measures was to
implement a more thorough regulatory regime to alleviate the conflict of interest problems that
have plagued analyst recommendations in recent years.”).
224. Order to Prohibit Participation by a Research Analyst in a Road Show Related to an
Investment Banking Services Transaction and to Require Certain Communications About an
Investment Banking Services Transaction to be Fair, Balanced and Not Misleading, Exchange Act
Release No. 51593, 85 SEC Docket 739 (April 21, 2005).
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analyst’s opinion represents his personal views helps ensure the analyst is
not accountable to a third party, such as the issuer he is researching or the
investment banking arm of the firm that employs him, which, acting as
securities underwriter or strategic advisor, has its own directional goals in
mind.
Whether recent reforms have caused analysts to become independent
once again is unknown. Evidence continues of retaliation and pressure on
analysts from both company officials and institutional investors to avoid
sell recommendations.225 Some have suggested that independent research
departments will not survive because, without investment banking revenue,
financial firms must pay securities analysts out of revenue obtained from
trading commissions, which are not as lucrative as they once were.226
In the meantime, the SEC, NASD, or others, could consider educating
the public on how to interpret research calls or other information from sellside analysts, analysts who typically work for brokerage firms and generate
research for the investing public. One should recognize that sell-side
analysts have little incentive to issue a “sell” recommendation. Issuers
generally do not like a “sell” recommendation because it might cause the
stock to decline in value. Some evidence indicates that, in many cases, if
enough analysts downgrade the stock, it can cost the CEO his or her job.227
Similarly, most investors do not like a “sell” recommendation because they
are “long” in the stock. Investors who already own shares also may not like
a sell recommendation for the deeper reason that it could call into question
their previous decision to buy and, as discussed, once people commit to a
decision, they usually do not change their minds—even in the face of
evidence to the contrary.
The rule which now requires analysts to disclose the ratio of buy-to-sell
recommendations is an important start toward educating the public on how
to interpret analysts’ recommendations, but additional education is needed.
Sell-side analysts, for example, are generally not compensated based solely
on investment performance. Buy-side firms rate, and presumably pay, sellside analysts based on factors other than performance, including timeliness
of information, responsiveness, innovation, and comprehensibility of

225. Gretchen Morgenson, Downgrade a Stock, Then Duck And Cover, N.Y. TIMES, March 12,
2006, at BU1; Nocera, supra note 41 (“[B]uy recommendations still vastly outnumber sells—and
most analysts still spend far more time currying favor with companies than analyzing them.”).
226. It also is possible that the recent failure of analysts to be independent can be traced to the
elimination of fixed commissions in the 1970s. After commissions were deregulated, brokerage
firms could not afford to pay analysts, and they went to work instead for investment banks and
underwriters, who funded their research. Healy & Palepu, supra note 39, at 80 (explaining how
research costs were covered through fixed commissions). Regardless of whether such research is
economical, the norm of independence is not diminished.
227. Jason Leow, “Sell”=Fire: Analysts’ Views Cloud CEOs’ Jobs; Credit Suisse Looks at
Case of Provocative Email, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2006, at B3.
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research reports.228 Additional education on some or all of these issues
could be valuable to the public.
3. Dependent Gatekeepers and Lawyer Certifications
The problem of how to enhance the monitoring role of dependent
gatekeepers is more intractable because of the reasons discussed in Parts I
and II. Others have recognized that dependent gatekeepers play a role as
advocate for a client, which is in tension with the role as gatekeeper.229 How
does this tension arise? Because attorneys often are closely aligned with
their clients in an “informal partnership” to accomplish their clients’
objectives, requiring attorneys to act as gatekeepers may place them in a
situation where they are required to audit their own work.230 Similarly, once
a client and an attorney have committed to a particular course of action, the
attorney may be biased toward the client’s directional goals at the expense
of accuracy and fail to put a halt to the course of action previously
determined.
John Coffee has suggested that the SEC could adopt a rule requiring a
securities lawyer to certify that he has reviewed the non-financial disclosure
in publicly filed reports, and that the attorney believes the statements are
true and he is not aware of any material omissions.231 Such a certification,
Coffee says, is consistent with certifications required of auditors, analysts,
and senior officers, and it would simply fill a void for Exchange Act filings
that is currently filled by standard negative assurance letters in the case of
Securities Act filings.232 Moreover, the certification, according to Coffee,
ideally would include a statement that the attorney undertook reasonable
inquiry, which would establish a due diligence obligation.233 While this
proposal has merit, it is narrow in scope because it would be limited to the
relatively small group of lawyers who are principally responsible for
preparing a document or report filed with the SEC.
A more ambitious reform may be appropriate. Congress in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was concerned about all “attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of
issuers.”234 This language includes a larger group of attorneys than those
principally responsible for preparing a document filed with the SEC. In
adopting rules under this provision, the SEC defined the scope of appearing
and practicing before the Commission as: (i) transacting any business with
228. See Tom Johnson, The 2005 All-America Research Team, INSTITUTIONAL INV., Oct. 1,
2005, at 54, 81.
229. Coffee, supra note 1, at 353.
230. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
231. Coffee, supra note 1, at 355–56; Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 7,
at 1312–15.
232. Coffee, supra note 1, at 357.
233. Id. at 358.
234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2002).
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the SEC; (ii) representing an issuer in any SEC investigation, inquiry, or
request; (iii) providing securities laws advice regarding any document the
attorney knows will be filed with the SEC; or (iv) advising an issuer on
whether information, under the securities laws, must be filed with the
SEC.235 Thus, the scope of the attorney conduct rules is relatively broad.
One possible solution is to marry these two approaches and require an
annual certification under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Under the SEC’s
rules, an attorney appearing and practicing before the SEC already is
subject to a reporting requirement. Under the SEC’s rule as adopted, an
attorney who “becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the
issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer . . . [must]
report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer . . . or to both the
issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief executive officer . . . forthwith.”236
Thus, lawyers already have a clear obligation to make a report if they
become “aware” of certain evidence. One possibility, therefore, is to require
an annual certification to the SEC or the bar that a lawyer, covered by this
rule, is either not aware of such evidence or has made the required report.
This proposal should entail only modest tangible costs by attorneys
(although it would likely result in emotional distress). Those appearing and
practicing before the SEC already must make the determinations that would
be required by a certification. Under current law, an attorney who is aware
of evidence of a material violation must make a report of the evidence
“forthwith.”237 For those attorneys who spend no time considering whether
a report is needed, the proposal would require some action on their part.
The SEC or state bar associations would of course incur costs in processing
the certifications, which would have to be received and tracked on a regular
basis.
The proposal would have important salutary effects for at least four
reasons. First, it would require securities lawyers, who are not yet aware of
the requirements of section 307, to not only become aware, but to undertake
the inquiry expected by the Act and the SEC’s rules. Second, requiring a
certification would require securities lawyers to reflect on their current
matters, and state of awareness, and deliberate over whether they could
make the required certification or whether a “reporting up” was called for.
This could be the triggering mechanism to which Darley refers when he
indicates that improper decisions can be overridden by deliberate thinking if
something can trigger the deliberate thinking into action.238 Third, the
proposal would counter the biases that arise from the perils of accountability, discussed above. To the extent that the attorney is required to make
a truthful, objective filing to a regulator or state bar, the attorney will
235.
236.
237.
238.

17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (2006).
Id. § 205.3(b)(1) (2006).
Id.
Darley, supra note 106, at 1183.
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necessarily have accuracy and not directional goals in mind. Finally,
requiring a certification would mean that an attorney, who violated the rule,
would make a false filing, which is qualitatively different than failing to
make any filing at all. I have discussed elsewhere the difference between a
wrongful act on the one hand and a wrongful omission on the other, which
some call “omission bias.”239 The prospect of making a false filing would
likely have deterrent effects absent where the harm amounted to failing to
make a filing.
This proposal also is consistent with the rationale for CEO and CFO
certifications required by Sarbanes-Oxley. That rationale, drawn from the
1980 requirement for certain senior officers and a majority of the board to
sign the annual report, is that people are more likely to pay attention to disclosures made in a report, and to participate more closely in the preparation
of a report, if they have to sign them.240
CONCLUSION
Gatekeepers are not alike, and the distinction between independent and
dependent gatekeepers is important to an understanding of gatekeeper
behavior. Independent gatekeepers, like auditors and analysts, should critically evaluate a set of data and render an opinion for an unknown audience.
Dependent gatekeepers, such as lawyers and underwriters, act on a client’s
behalf providing advice and recommendations to a known audience—the
client itself—in reaching its goals. Consequently, independent gatekeepers
will be better monitors than dependent gatekeepers, and perform a more
robust gatekeeper role. That conclusion is consistent with research in the
area of social and behavioral psychology, which teaches that people’s
behavior is influenced by others and that goals and motives can influence
our thinking. Accountability to a known audience and commitment to a
course of conduct can alter a rational evaluation of the facts. These
phenomena appear more starkly in the case of dependent gatekeepers and
are more likely to influence their behavior.
The differences between independent and dependent gatekeepers, and
the lessons from social and behavioral psychology, help explain many of
the recent reforms for gatekeepers, including auditors and analysts.
239. Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
75, 130–31 (2004) (discussing reasons the common law holds an actor more responsible for an act
than a failure to act); see also Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in
the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 789 (2006) (“Omission bias,
sometimes referred to as regret theory, refers to the finding that individuals regret adverse
consequences stemming from their actions more than adverse consequences stemming from their
inaction.”); Kim, supra note 9, at 1033–34 (explaining that “omission bias” is relevant for
securities lawyers who choose not to prevent misconduct and later shift blame to others as
proximate cause of harm).
240. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange
Act Release No. 46079, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877 (June 20, 2002).
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Moreover, the same lessons can help with additional reforms in the case of
dependent gatekeepers, such as lawyers. One tentative proposal that bears
additional consideration is to require certifications to the SEC or state bar
by securities lawyers stating positively that they are unaware of evidence
that would necessitate a “reporting up” under the SEC’s lawyer rules. This
affirmative obligation would combat the biases discussed in this paper and
have other salutary effects.

